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BLACKWELL v. WYETH: IT’S OUR COURTROOM AND WE’LL
FRYE (ONLY) IF WE WANT TO—THE MARYLAND
COURT OF APPEALS’S UNSTATED
ADOPTION OF DAUBERT
NANCY E. BONIFANT*
In Blackwell v. Wyeth,1 the Court of Appeals of Maryland addressed
the admissibility of expert testimony that attempted to establish a
causal connection between thimerosal and autism pursuant to the
Frye/Reed standard and Maryland Rule of Evidence 5-702.2  The court
held the expert testimony inadmissible because the novel methodol-
ogy, theory, and analytical framework proposed by the plaintiffs’ prof-
fered epidemiological expert were not “generally accepted” within the
relevant scientific community as required by Frye/Reed.3 The court
also found the proffered epidemiologist and the plaintiffs’ remaining
experts to be unqualified to address disease causation pursuant to
Rule 5-702.4  In so holding, the court correctly excluded the expert
testimony,5 but significantly collapsed the Maryland Frye/Reed standard
into the federal Daubert standard by relying on Daubert precedent and
considering several Daubert factors.6  The Court of Appeals should
have acknowledged this collapse and formally adopted Daubert to ac-
count for differences in the following: (1) the arguments raised by
litigants, (2) the role of judges in making evidentiary determinations,7
and (3) the appellate review standards pursuant to either standard.8
Such an acknowledgment would have avoided inconsistencies in the
application of expert testimony admissibility standards in Maryland
Copyright  2010 by Nancy E. Bonifant.
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1. 408 Md. 575, 971 A.2d 235 (2009).
2. Id. at 577–78, 971 A.2d at 236–37.
3. Id. at 585, 608–09, 617–18, 971 A.2d at 241, 255, 260–61.
4. Id. at 618, 630, 971 A.2d at 261, 268.
5. See infra Part IV.A.
6. See infra Part IV.B.
7. See infra Part IV.B, C.1.
8. See infra Part IV.C.2.
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courts and promoted true assessment of novel scientific evidence by
trial judges.9
I. THE CASE
Between 1985 and 1989, Jamarr Blackwell received several admin-
istrations of the diphtheria tetanus and whole-cell pertussis (“DTP”)
vaccine and haemophilus influenzae type b (“Hib”) vaccine.10  Both of
these vaccines contained fifty micrograms of the organic mercury-
based preservative thimerosal.11  Thimerosal is forty-nine percent mer-
cury by weight and therefore Jamarr received approximately twenty-
five micrograms of mercury with each administration of these
vaccines.12
On June 11, 2004, Jamarr’s parents, Pamela and Ernest Blackwell
(“Blackwells”), brought a products liability action alleging that the thi-
merosal preservative in the DTP and Hib vaccines manufactured by
Wyeth and other defendants injured Jamarr.13  The Blackwells con-
tended that exposure to thimerosal proximately caused Jamarr to de-
velop autism.14  To support this allegation, the Blackwells sought to
proffer the expert testimony of Professors Boyd Haley15 and Richard
Deth,16 and Doctors Elizabeth Mumper,17 Mark Geier,18 and Stephen
Seibert19 to establish that exposure to thimerosal in the DTP and Hib
vaccines generally causes autism in genetically susceptible individu-
9. See infra Part IV.C.
10. Blackwell v. Sigma Aldrich, Inc., No. 24-C-04-004829, slip op. at 10–11 (Md. Cir. Ct.
Dec. 21, 2007), available at http://www.baltocts.state.md.us/about/publications/opinions/
blackwell_memorandum_opinion.pdf.  The name provided for the Hib vaccine reflects
that used by the Center for Disease Control and Prevention. CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION, HAEMOPHILUS INFLUENZAE TYPE B (HIB) VACCINE: WHAT YOU NEED TO KNOW 1
(1998), http://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/pubs/vis/downloads/vis-hib.pdf.
11. Blackwell, No. 24-C-04-004829, slip op. at 10–11.
12. Id.
13. See id. at 1, 11.  Although Jamarr had reached the age of majority by the time of the
lawsuit, he remained unable to manage his own legal and business affairs. Id. at 1. There-
fore, Pamela and Ernest Blackwell brought this action both as his parents and next friends.
Id.
14. Id. at 1, 7.
15. Id. at 20–21.  Dr. Haley was a professor of chemistry at the University of Kentucky
and studied mercury’s adverse effects on the brain. Id. at 20.
16. Id. at 21.  Dr. Deth was a professor of pharmacology at Northeastern University and
sought to testify on thimerosal’s effects on the brain. Id.
17. Id. at 21–22. Dr. Mumper was a general pediatrician and testified, based on her
clinical experience, as to the neurological effects of mercury on children. Id.
18. Id. at 22–23.  Dr. Geier was a genetic counselor and an obstetrician and testified,
based on eleven epidemiological studies he conducted, that thimerosal-containing vaccines
cause autism. Id. at 22, 24.
19. Id. at 23.  Dr. Siebert was a psychiatrist with a master’s degree in public health. Id.
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als.20  Wyeth subsequently sought to preclude the testimony of these
expert witnesses pursuant to the Frye/Reed standard21 and Maryland
Rule of Evidence 5-702.22
The Circuit Court for Baltimore City conducted a ten day, pre-
trial evidentiary hearing to determine the admissibility of the
Blackwells’ proffered expert witness testimony.23  According to the cir-
cuit court, Frye/Reed sets forth the minimum threshold standard for
the admissibility of novel scientific theories, which is that the theories
must be generally accepted within the relevant scientific community.24
In addition, the expert must be qualified.25  The circuit court found
epidemiology to be the most relevant scientific field to the general
causation issue,26 and noted that Dr. Geier was the only witness prof-
fered by the Blackwells as an epidemiological expert.27  Therefore, the
circuit court assessed only the admissibility of Dr. Geier’s testimony
pursuant to the Frye/Reed standard.28
Several of Dr. Geier’s epidemiological studies utilized the Vaccine
Adverse Event Reporting System,29 and he testified that in all eleven
of his epidemiological studies there was evidence of a causal link be-
20. Id. at 20–23, 30.
21. Id. at 1.  The Frye/Reed standard provides that novel scientific theories must be gen-
erally accepted by the relevant scientific community in order to be admissible.  Frye v.
United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923); Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374, 381, 391 A.2d
364, 368 (1978); see infra Part II.A.1.
22. Blackwell, No. 24-C-04-004829, slip op. at 1.  Rule 5-702 provides the following:
Expert testimony may be admitted, in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if the
court determines that the testimony will assist the trier of fact to understand the
evidence or to determine a fact in issue.  In making that determination, the court
shall determine (1) whether the witness is qualified as an expert by knowledge,
skill, experience, training, or education, (2) the appropriateness of the expert
testimony on the particular subject, and (3) whether a sufficient factual basis ex-
ists to support the expert testimony.
MD. R. 5-702.
23. Blackwell, No. 24-C-04-004829, slip op. at 2.
24. Id. at 2–3.
25. Id. at 3; see MD. R. 5-702 (noting that “the court shall determine (1) whether the
witness is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education”).
26. Blackwell, No. 24-C-04-004829, slip op. at 23–24.  Epidemiology is the study of the
distribution of diseases within a population, and medical causality is central to that study.
Id.
27. Id. at 24.
28. Id. The court separately addressed the admissibility of the testimony of Dr. Geier
and the testimony of the Blackwells’ other experts pursuant to Rule 5-702. Id. at 33–41.
29. Id. at 25. The Vaccine Adverse Event Reporting System is a post-marketing safety
surveillance program conducted by the Center for Disease Control and the Food and Drug
Administration where post-vaccination adverse side effects are reported, analyzed, and dis-
seminated to the public.  United States Department of Health and Human Services, Vac-
cine Adverse Event Reporting System, http://www.vaers.hhs.gov (last visited Mar. 28,
2010).  Dr. Geier also utilized the Vaccine Safety Datalink, the Department of Education
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tween exposure to thimerosal-containing vaccines and autism.30  Dr.
Geier performed a differential diagnosis31 analytical framework to
support the theory that exposure to thimerosal caused autism in ge-
netically susceptible individuals.32  The circuit court found that the
Blackwells failed to demonstrate that Dr. Geier’s novel methodology,
theory, and analytical framework were generally accepted as reliable
within the relevant scientific community, and therefore held his testi-
mony inadmissible pursuant to the Frye/Reed standard.33
The circuit court then considered Wyeth’s motion to exclude the
Blackwells’ expert testimony pursuant to Rule 5-702.34  The circuit
court noted that its inadmissibility determination under Frye/Reed re-
garding Dr. Geier’s testimony was arguably dispositive.35  Neverthe-
less, the circuit court went on to consider Dr. Geier’s qualifications, as
well as the remaining experts’ qualifications, pursuant to Rule 5-702.36
The circuit court found the experts proffered by the Blackwells to be
unqualified because they were not experts in the field of epidemiol-
ogy,37 which the court reasoned was necessary to establish that thimer-
osal-containing vaccines cause autism.38  Wyeth subsequently moved
for summary judgment and the circuit court granted the motion.39
The Court of Appeals of Maryland granted certiorari prior to any
proceedings in the Maryland Court of Special Appeals to determine
whether the circuit court improperly applied the Frye/Reed standard to
database, and the California Department of Social Services database in one or more of his
epidemiological studies. Blackwell, No. 24-C-04-004829, slip op. at 25.
30. Blackwell, No. 24-C-04-004829, slip op. at 24.
31. Id. at 33.  A differential diagnosis is a methodology that determines the cause of a
medical problem by ruling out other possible causes until the most probable cause re-
mains. Id.
32. Id. at 30.  Specifically, Dr. Geier associated “the A1298C polymorphism in the
MTHFR gene; the null polymorphism of the GSTMI gene; the I105V polymorphism of the
GSTPI gene; the I114T, R197Q, and K268R polymorphisms in the NATZ gene; and an
unspecified variant in the CYP3A4 gene” to contribute to a child’s genetic susceptibility.
Id. at 31.
33. Id. at 30, 48–49.
34. Id. at 33–34.
35. Id. at 34.
36. Id. at 34, 37–41.
37. Id. at 36–41. While the circuit court addressed Dr. Geier’s testimony pursuant to
the Frye/Reed standard because he was proffered as an expert in the field of epidemiology
by the Blackwells, the circuit court ultimately concluded he was unqualified because his
credentials as a medical doctor and genetic counselor did not provide the adequate foun-
dation for him to testify as to whether thimerosal caused autism. Id. at 24, 36–37.
38. Id. at 23–24.
39. Blackwell v. Sigma Aldrich, Inc., No. 24-C-04-004829, slip op. at 1 (Md. Cir. Ct. Feb.
8, 2008).
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Dr. Geier’s conclusions, rather than to the bases upon which he
reached those conclusions, and whether the circuit court abused its
discretion in finding the Blackwell experts’ testimony inadmissible for
failing to meet the requirements of Rule 5-702.40
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Maryland courts admit expert testimony pursuant to two separate
channels—the Frye/Reed standard and Maryland Rule of Evidence 5-
702.41  Expert testimony discussing novel scientific theories must meet
the minimum threshold Frye/Reed standard42 in addition to the Rule 5-
702 requirements to be admissible.43  Expert testimony addressing
non-novel scientific evidence, however, must only meet the require-
ments of Rule 5-702.44  In contrast, a unanimous United States Su-
preme Court rejected the Frye standard’s applicability to federal courts
in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.45 and held that federal
courts shall admit all expert testimony pursuant to Federal Rule of
Evidence (“FRE”) 702.46  The Frye/Reed and Daubert standards, as well
as Rule 5-702 and FRE 702, all developed concurrently and in re-
sponse to each other, and their development can be divided into
three eras: (1) the supremacy of Frye from 1923 to 1993;47 (2) the
Supreme Court’s announcement of the federal Daubert standard and
Maryland’s promulgation of Rule 5-702 from 1993 to 1994;48 and (3)
Frye/Reed’s collapse into Daubert from 1994 to the present.49
40. Blackwell v. Wyeth, 408 Md. 575, 579–80, 971 A.2d 235, 238 (2009).
41. See United States v. Horn, 185 F. Supp. 2d 530, 547–48 n.29 (D. Md. 2002) (“Under
Maryland evidence law, the Frye/Reed test applies only to introduction of [novel] scientific
evidence, and Rule 5-702 alone covers all other types of expert opinion testimony.”); Reed
v. State, 283 Md. 374, 389, 391 A.2d 364, 372 (1978) (“Testimony based on a technique
which is found to have gained ‘general acceptance in the scientific community’ may be
admitted into evidence, but only if a trial judge also determines in the exercise of his
discretion . . . that the expert is properly qualified . . . .”).
42. See infra Part II.A.1.
43. See infra text accompanying notes 97–101. R
44. See supra note 41. R
45. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
46. See infra Part II.B–C.
47. See infra Part II.A.
48. See infra Part II.B.
49. See infra Part II.C.
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A. Following Frye, Federal and Maryland Courts Evaluated Novel
Scientific Theories Similarly
In the era in which Frye v. United States50 reigned supreme, state
and federal courts followed Frye’s holding that trial courts may admit
expert testimony discussing novel scientific theories only if those theo-
ries are generally accepted within the relevant scientific community.51
Following its announcement, many federal and state courts adopted
the Frye standard.52  The Court of Appeals of Maryland adopted Frye in
Reed v. State,53 and despite the promulgation of FRE 702 in 1975,54
many federal courts continued to apply Frye’s general acceptance
standard.55
1. Frye v. United States Set Forth the “General Acceptance”
Standard that Was Subsequently Adopted by the Maryland
Court of Appeals in Reed v. State
In Frye, a brief opinion devoid of supporting case precedent, the
Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia set forth the original
admissibility standard governing expert testimony as to novel scientific
theories.56  The court refused to admit the defendant’s expert testi-
mony interpreting a systolic blood pressure deception test to prove
the defendant’s truthfulness.57  The Frye court observed the following:
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line
between the experimental and demonstrable stages is diffi-
cult to define.  Somewhere in this twilight zone the eviden-
tial force of the principle must be recognized, and while
courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony de-
duced from a well-recognized scientific principle or discov-
ery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently
established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field
in which it belongs.58
50. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
51. See infra Part II.A.1.
52. See infra Part II.A.1–2.
53. 283 Md. 374, 391 A.2d 364 (1978); see infra Part II.A.1.
54. Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926, 1937.
55. See infra Part II.A.2.
56. See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (finding that in order
to be admissible, the scientific principle or discovery must “have gained general acceptance
in the particular field in which it belongs”).
57. Id. at 1013–14.  The systolic blood pressure deception test measured changes in
systolic blood pressure, and the proffered expert asserted that rises in systolic blood pres-
sure were brought about by “nervous impulses sent to the sympathetic branch of the auto-
nomic nervous system” indicative of “conscious deception or falsehood.” Id. at 1013.
58. Id. at 1014 (emphasis added).
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The Frye court held the testimony to be inadmissible because the de-
fendant failed to show the systolic blood pressure deception test had
gained such standing.59
In Reed v. State,60 the Maryland Court of Appeals addressed the
admissibility of expert testimony interpreting voiceprint spectrograms
that compared the defendant’s voice to telephone calls made by an
alleged rapist.61  Adopting the Frye “general acceptance” standard,62
the court held the testimony to be inadmissible.63  The court reasoned
that the application of novel scientific techniques must be reliable,64
and general acceptance within the relevant scientific community best
demonstrates such reliability.65  The identity of the relevant scientific
community, the court discussed, depends upon the particular tech-
nique at issue and generally “includes those whose scientific back-
ground and training are sufficient to allow them to comprehend and
understand the process and form a judgment about it.”66  The court
further reasoned that the reliability of new techniques does “not vary
according to the circumstances of each case” and is therefore not “a
matter within each trial judge’s individual discretion.”67  The court
found the voiceprint spectrograms were not generally accepted within
the relevant scientific community and excluded the evidence.68
2. FRE 702 Omitted a Reference to “General Acceptance,” but Federal
Case Law Continued to Rely on the Frye Standard
Despite the absence of Frye or its “general acceptance” standard
from the language of FRE 702, many federal courts continued to ap-
ply Frye following the promulgation of FRE 702. Congress first en-
acted the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975.69  According to the
original FRE 702, “[i]f scientific, technical, or other specialized knowl-
edge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to deter-
mine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge,
skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the
form of an opinion or otherwise.”70  As the Supreme Court later ac-
59. Id.
60. 283 Md. 374, 391 A.2d 364 (1978).
61. Id. at 375–76, 391 A.2d at 364–65.
62. Id. at 389, 391 A.2d at 372.
63. Id. at 399, 391 A.2d at 377.
64. Id. at 380, 391 A.2d at 367.
65. Id. at 381, 391 A.2d at 368.
66. Id. at 382, 391 A.2d at 368.
67. Id. at 381, 391 A.2d at 367–68.
68. Id. at 399, 391 A.2d at 377.
69. Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926.
70. 28 U.S.C. app. R. 702 (1976) (amended 2000).
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knowledged in Daubert, there is no reference to Frye or its “general
acceptance” standard within FRE 702 or its drafting history.71  Regard-
less of this omission, many federal courts continued to apply the Frye
standard.
In United States v. Tranowski72 and United States v. Shorter,73 the
United States Courts of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit and the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit referenced FRE 702, but only generally re-
garding the qualifications of experts74 and the relevance of expert
testimony,75 respectively.  The admissibility of the expert testimony in
those cases, however, ultimately turned on those courts’ application of
the Frye standard.  In Tranowski, the Seventh Circuit cited Frye in refus-
ing to admit the testimony of the Government’s astronomy expert at-
tempting to date a photograph by measuring the lengths of shadows
to determine the altitude and azimuth of the sun.76  The court found
that an application of this technique had never been performed
before and was not “‘sufficiently established to have gained general
acceptance in the particular field to which it belongs.’”77  Similarly, in
Shorter, the D.C. Circuit held that novel scientific methods must meet
the Frye standard and refused to admit the expert’s testimony because
the relevant scientific community did not generally accept a link be-
tween pathological gambling and the failure to pay taxes.78
In United States v. Brown79 and United States v. Hendershot,80 the
Sixth and Ninth Circuits made little or no reference to FRE 702 in
addressing the admissibility of expert testimony.  In Brown, the Sixth
Circuit mentioned FRE 702 in a single citation,81 but affirmed the fol-
71. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 588 (1993) (“Nothing
in the text of this Rule establishes ‘general acceptance’ as an absolute prerequisite to ad-
missibility.  Nor does respondent present any clear indication that [FRE] 702 or the Rules
as a whole were intended to incorporate a ‘general acceptance’ standard.  The drafting
history makes no mention of Frye . . . .”).
72. 659 F.2d 750 (7th Cir. 1981).
73. 809 F.2d 54 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
74. Tranowski, 659 F.2d at 754–55.
75. Shorter, 809 F.2d at 59.
76. Tranowski, 659 F.2d at 755–56.
77. Id. (quoting Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923)).
78. Shorter, 809 F.2d at 59–61.
79. 557 F.2d 541 (6th Cir. 1977).
80. 614 F.2d 648 (9th Cir. 1980).
81. Brown, 557 F.2d at 556 (citing FED. R. EVID. 702). After discussing Frye’s “general
acceptance” standard as a necessary predicate to admission of expert testimony, the court
cited FRE 702 to support its contention that “[t]he clear trend in federal court [was] to-
ward the admission of expert testimony whenever it [would] aid the trier of fact.” Id. (cit-
ing FED. R. EVID. 702). The court went on to rebut this trend and discussed a four-prong
test as necessary to protect the defendant’s interest in a fair trial. Id. (quoting United
States v. Baller, 519 F.2d 463, 466 (4th Cir. 1975)).
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lowing four-prong test to determine the admissibility of expert testi-
mony: “ ‘1. qualified expert; 2. proper subject; 3. conformity to a generally
accepted explanatory theory; and 4. probative value compared to prejudi-
cial effect.’”82  Analyzing the third prong, the court cited Frye and
held that the Government failed to demonstrate the “ion microprobic
analysis [was] a generally accepted procedure” and failed to show the
experiments were reliable and accurate enough “to be said to cross
‘the line between the experimental and demonstrable stages.’”83  Sim-
ilarly, in Hendershot, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the admissibility of ex-
pert testimony because the Government demonstrated that the
shoeprint technique utilized at the crime scene was generally ac-
cepted, but made no reference to FRE 702.84
B. The Great Schism: Daubert Removes Frye from the Federal Courts
and Maryland Rule of Evidence 5-702 Retains Frye/Reed in
the Wake of Daubert
Eighteen years after Congress enacted the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence, a unanimous United States Supreme Court held that adoption
of FRE 702 superseded Frye.85  In Daubert, the Court vacated the Ninth
Circuit’s judgment to exclude the plaintiff’s expert testimony demon-
strating a causal link between Bendectin and birth defects after the
Ninth Circuit determined the expert’s methodology was not generally
accepted as reliable in the relevant scientific community.86  According
to the Court, nothing in the text of FRE 702 established the necessity
of “general acceptance,” and nothing in the drafting history indicated
the incorporation of Frye.87
A majority of the Court went on to address the trial judge’s
“gatekeeping role”88 and the limitations FRE 702 placed on scientific
knowledge.89  The Court distinguished Frye’s limited applicability and
FRE 702: While Frye “focused exclusively on ‘novel’ scientific tech-
niques, [the Court did] not read the requirements of [FRE] 702 to
82. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Green, 548 F.2d 1261, 1268 (6th
Cir. 1977)).
83. Id. at 557 (quoting Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923)).
84. Hendershot, 614 F.2d at 654.
85. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993).
86. Id. at 584, 597–98.
87. Id. at 588.
88. See id. at 589, 597.  According to the majority, the trial judge must screen expert
testimony to ensure that all scientific testimony and evidence is relevant and reliable. Id. at
589.
89. Id. at 589.
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apply specifically or exclusively to unconventional evidence.”90  There-
fore, all expert testimony discussing scientific knowledge, and, more
specifically, the methodology or technique upon which it was based,
must be relevant, reliable, helpful, and “fit.”91  To determine whether
the methodology or technique meets those four factors, the Court set
forth the following inquiries: (1) whether the theory or technique
can, or has been, tested;92 (2) whether the theory or technique has
been subjected to peer review and publication;93 (3) what the tech-
nique’s known or potential rate of error was;94 (4) whether standards
exist and are maintained for the technique’s operation;95 and (5)
whether the theory or technique has “general acceptance” within the
relevant scientific community.96
One year after Daubert, the Maryland Court of Appeals adopted
Rule 5-702.97  The Rule states the following:
Expert testimony may be admitted, in the form of an opinion
or otherwise, if the court determines that the testimony will
assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to deter-
mine a fact in issue.  In making that determination, the court
shall determine (1) whether the witness is qualified as an ex-
pert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education,
(2) the appropriateness of the expert testimony on the par-
ticular subject, and (3) whether a sufficient factual basis ex-
ists to support the expert testimony.98
According to the Committee’s note, this Rule was not intended to
overrule the Frye/Reed standard.99  Instead, “[t]he required scientific
foundation for the admission of novel scientific techniques or princi-
ples is left to development through case law.”100  Thus, promulgation
of Rule 5-702 created two separate channels for Maryland courts to
admit expert testimony—the Frye/Reed standard in conjunction with
90. Id. at 592 n.11.
91. Id. at 589–92.
92. Id. at 593.
93. Id. at 593–94.
94. Id. at 594.
95. Id.
96. Id.  The Court stated “general acceptance” was “an important factor in ruling par-
ticular evidence admissible,” and could have a bearing on the inquiry. Id.
97. MD. R. 5-702.
98. Id.
99. MD. R. 5-702 committee’s note (“This Rule is not intended to overrule Reed v. State,
283 Md. 374 (1978) and other cases adopting the principles enunciated in Frye v. United
States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).”).
100. Id.
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Rule 5-702 for novel scientific theories and Rule 5-702 for all other
expert testimony.101
C. Despite Subsequent Developments to the Daubert Standard that
Further Distinguished Daubert from the Frye/Reed Standard,
Maryland Case Law Has Significantly Merged with
Daubert Precedent
Despite Maryland courts’ stated adherence to the Frye/Reed stan-
dard, application of Frye/Reed has collapsed significantly into the de-
veloping federal Daubert standard.  Since Daubert, the United States
Supreme Court has had two opportunities to further define Daubert’s
applicability,102 and in 2000, Congress amended FRE 702 to incorpo-
rate the principles articulated in the Daubert trilogy.103  In light of the
Daubert trilogy and the 2000 amendment to FRE 702, many federal
courts were forced to reconsider past Frye holdings.104 The Maryland
courts also were not outside Daubert’s influence, and subsequent to
the Rule 5-702 Committee’s note’s “wait and see” approach, Mary-
land’s Frye/Reed standard collapsed into the Daubert trilogy.105
1. The Daubert Trilogy: The United States Supreme Court Adopted
an Abuse of Discretion Standard of Review and Applied
Daubert to All Expert Testimony, Leading to an
Amendment to the Federal Evidence Rules in 2000
The Daubert trilogy consists of three cases—Daubert,106 General
Electric Co. v. Joiner,107 and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael108—and dem-
onstrates the Supreme Court’s attempt to further refine its expert ad-
missibility standard.  In Joiner, the Court set forth an abuse of
discretion appellate standard of review consistent with trial judges’
“gatekeeper” role articulated in Daubert.109  In Kumho, the Court held
101. See supra note 41 and accompanying text. R
102. See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 141 (1999) (extending Daubert’s
holding to include testimony based on “technical” or “other specialized” knowledge, in
addition to “scientific knowledge”); Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 141–43 (1997)
(confirming an abuse of discretion standard of review for evidentiary rulings). Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S.
136, and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, are commonly referred to as the
Daubert trilogy.
103. See infra Part II.C.1.
104. See infra Part II.C.2.
105. See infra Part II.C.3.
106. 509 U.S. 579.
107. 522 U.S. 136.
108. 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
109. See infra text accompanying notes 113–18. R
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that Daubert was applicable to all expert testimony and not simply sci-
entific expert testimony,110 and further articulated that the Daubert
factors were relevant to, but not dispositive of, admissibility of an ex-
pert’s testimony.111  In 2000, Congress incorporated the Daubert tril-
ogy into FRE 702.112
In Joiner, the respondent alleged his small-cell lung cancer re-
sulted from exposure to polychlorinated biphenyls in electrical trans-
formers manufactured by General Electric and other defendants.113
In response to the Eleventh Circuit’s “ ‘particularly stringent standard
of review to the trial judge’s exclusion of expert testimony,’”114 peti-
tioners appealed and argued for a traditional “abuse of discretion”
review.115  A unanimous Court agreed with the petitioners and held
that appellate courts should review a trial judge’s admissibility deter-
mination pursuant to Daubert and FRE 702 under an abuse of discre-
tion standard.116  A majority of the Court further explained that while
Daubert suggested that a trial judge’s focus must be on the principles
and methodology employed by the expert and not on his conclusions,
there may not be “too great an analytical gap between the data and
the opinion proffered.”117  Therefore, the Court held that the district
court did not abuse its discretion because “[n]othing in either Daubert
or the Federal Rules of Evidence requires a district court to admit
opinion evidence which is connected to existing data only by the ipse
dixit of the expert.”118
In Kumho, the Court addressed the admissibility of an engineer’s
expert testimony regarding potential defects in a tire’s manufactur-
ing.119  A unanimous Court extended Daubert’s general “gatekeeping”
holding to apply not only to testimony based on “scientific knowl-
edge,” but also to testimony based on “technical” or “other special-
ized” knowledge as articulated in FRE 702.120  To further clarify
110. See infra text accompanying notes 119–22. R
111. See Kumho, 526 U.S. at 159 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“[As] the Court makes clear
today, the Daubert factors are not holy writ . . . .”).
112. See infra notes 123–26 and accompanying text. R
113. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 139–40 (1997).
114. Id. at 140 (quoting Joiner v. Gen. Elec. Co., 78 F.3d 524, 529 (11th Cir. 1996)).
115. Id. at 140–41.
116. Id. at 141–43.  The Court based its conclusion on cases dating back to 1879, specifi-
cally Spring Co. v. Edgar, 99 U.S. 645 (1879), stating that “‘[c]ases arise where it is very
much a matter of discretion with the court whether to receive or exclude the evidence; but
the appellate court will not reverse in such a case, unless the ruling is manifestly errone-
ous.’” Joiner, 522 U.S. at 141–42 (quoting Edgar, 99 U.S. at 658).
117. Joiner, 522 U.S. at 146.
118. Id.
119. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 142–43 (1999).
120. Id. at 141.
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Daubert’s applicability to all forms of expert testimony, the Court rea-
soned that a trial judge may consider one or more Daubert factors to
assess the testimony’s reliability,121 noting that the list of specific fac-
tors do not necessarily apply to every expert.122
Following the Court’s decisions in Daubert, Joiner, and Kumho,
Congress amended FRE 702 in 2000:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will as-
sist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to deter-
mine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may tes-
tify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the
testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is
the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness
has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the
case.123
According to the Advisory Committee’s note, the Court adopted these
changes in response to Daubert and cases applying Daubert, including
Kumho and Joiner.124  FRE 702’s broad language sought to account for
the Daubert factors, while not requiring any single factor and permit-
ting trial judges to consider other relevant factors articulated both
before and after Daubert.125  This approach provided the trial judge
with significant discretion to determine the admissibility of expert
testimony.126
2. Subsequent to Daubert and the 2000 Amendment to FRE 702,
Many Federal Courts Were Forced to Reconsider Previous
Holdings Under Frye
The Daubert trilogy prompted many federal courts to reconsider
previous holdings pursuant to Frye and address the differences be-
tween the Frye and Daubert standards.  Despite Daubert’s inclusion of
“general acceptance” as one potentially relevant factor, Frye and
121. Id. at 149–50.
122. Id.
123. FED. R. EVID. 702 (emphasis added).
124. FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note.
125. Id. The Advisory Committee’s note also mentioned several additional factors, in-
cluding (1) “[w]hether the expert has unjustifiably extrapolated from an accepted premise
to an unfounded conclusion,” and (2) “[w]hether the expert has adequately accounted for
obvious alternative explanations.” Id.
126. Id.
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Daubert are different standards that call for different analyses by trial
judges.127
In United States v. Prince-Oyibo,128 the Fourth Circuit considered
Daubert’s impact on the court’s per se bar on admission of polygraph
evidence established pursuant to Frye, and whether an en banc pro-
ceeding was necessary to overrule the court’s per se bar.129  In Prince-
Oyibo, the defendant sought to use a polygraph test to prove his lack of
intent to obtain a fraudulent visa.130  Distinguishing Daubert from Frye,
the court emphasized that a “ ‘trial judge must ensure that any and all
scientific testimony or evidence admitted is . . . reliable,’” and that
“[t]he analysis must be a ‘flexible one.’”131  While the court ultimately
held that only the en banc court had the authority to overrule the per
se bar, it noted its “inclin[ation] to hold that Daubert requires a more
nuanced evaluation of polygraph evidence than that dictated by the
per se rule.”132  The court in Prince-Oyibo therefore acknowledged that
Daubert and Frye were different standards that articulated different
roles for trial judges.
In United States v. Horn,133 the United States District Court for the
District of Maryland considered whether standard field sobriety tests
(“SFSTs”) were admissible to provide either circumstantial evidence of
intoxication or impairment, or direct evidence of specific blood alco-
hol content.134  Because the majority of case law on the admissibility
of SFSTs came from state courts applying Frye,135 Judge Grimm ad-
dressed several differences between the Frye and Daubert standards.136
First, “[u]nder Daubert . . . the trial court [is] forced to reckon with the
factors that really do determine whether the evidence is reliable, rele-
127. See, e.g., Ruffin v. Shaw Indus., Inc., 149 F.3d 294, 296 (4th Cir. 1998) (“[T]he
primary significance of the Supreme Court’s decision in Daubert was to make the ‘general
acceptance’ standard merely one factor in a multi-factor analysis, not the determinative test
for admitting scientific evidence.”).
128. 320 F.3d 494 (4th Cir. 2003).
129. Id. at 497–98.
130. Id. at 496.
131. Id. at 498 (quoting Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579,
589, 594 (1994)).
132. Id. at 501.  The court also acknowledged that the Fifth and Ninth Circuits “held
that Daubert effectively overturned their respective per se bars . . . leav[ing] the admission
or exclusion of such evidence to the discretion of the district courts.” Id. at 499 (citing
United States v. Cordoba, 104 F.3d 225, 227–28 (9th Cir. 1997); United States v. Posado, 57
F.3d 428, 433–34 (5th Cir. 1995)).
133. 185 F. Supp. 2d 530 (D. Md. 2002).
134. Id. at 534.
135. Id. at 535.
136. Id. at 553–54.
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vant and ‘fits’ the case at issue.”137  Conversely, under Frye, “all that is
needed to admit the evidence is the testimony of one or more experts
in the field that the evidence at issue derives from methods or proce-
dures that have become generally accepted.”138  As a result, Frye courts
never had to understand the evidence at issue.139  Further, once a court
concluded a methodology attained general acceptance under Frye, the
doctrine of stare decisis allowed “for subsequent courts simply to fol-
low suit” and “without there ever having been a contested, detailed
examination of the underpinnings of that methodology.”140  Finally,
Daubert did not merely apply to novel scientific theories, but applied
consistently to any expert testimony discussing scientific, technical, or
other specialized knowledge.141  As evident in Horn, the Daubert and
Frye standards require different applications by trial judges.
3. Despite the Differences Between Daubert and Frye/Reed,
Maryland Case Law Has Mirrored Federal Changes to
Daubert and FRE 702
Maryland courts consistently state adherence to the Frye/Reed
standard,142 but inconsistently permit Daubert to influence the admissi-
bility of expert testimony addressing novel scientific theories.  Applica-
tion of the Frye/Reed standard has included references to the trial
judge’s “wide latitude” in admissibility determinations,143 Daubert pre-
cedent,144 and the language of FRE 702,145 thus allowing Maryland
Frye/Reed case law to collapse into the Daubert standard.
In Reed, the Maryland Court of Appeals stated that the reliability
of novel scientific techniques was not a “matter within each trial
judge’s individual discretion.”146  Generally, “the admissibility of ex-
pert testimony is within the sound discretion of the trial judge,”147 and
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 554.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. See Clemons v. State, 392 Md. 339, 349 n.7, 896 A.2d 1059, 1065 n.7 (2006) (“Both
parties erroneously claimed that Maryland follow[ed] the Supreme Court’s reasoning in
Daubert . . . Maryland has continued to adhere to the Frye test rather than the Daubert
standard.”); Burral v. State, 352 Md. 707, 738, 724 A.2d 65, 80 (1999) (“[W]e have not
abandoned Frye or Reed.”); Schultz v. State, 106 Md. App. 145, 153 n.3, 664 A.2d 60, 64 n.3
(1995) (“[T]he Frye/Reed standard is still the standard utilized in Maryland to determine
the admissibility of scientific evidence.”).
143. See infra notes 150–55 and accompanying text. R
144. See infra text accompanying notes 156–62. R
145. See infra text accompanying notes 163–67. R
146. Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374, 381, 391 A.2d 364, 367 (1978).
147. Wilson v. State, 370 Md. 191, 200, 803 A.2d 1034, 1039 (2001) (emphasis added).
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therefore comes under an abuse of discretion standard of review.148
In contrast, appellate review regarding the reliability, and therefore
admissibility, of a novel scientific technique pursuant to the Frye/Reed
standard is de novo.149  On two recent occasions the Maryland Court
of Appeals referenced the trial judge’s “wide latitude in determining
whether expert testimony is sufficiently reliable to be admissible.”150
In Wilson v. State,151 the court accurately made this statement in refer-
ence to whether an expert was qualified pursuant to Rule 5-702.152  In
Montgomery Mutual Insurance Co. v. Chesson,153 the court referenced the
trial judge’s “wide latitude” in assessing the reliability of expert testi-
mony, but then further articulated that the Frye/Reed standard deter-
mined the reliability of novel scientific methods.154  Further, the
Chesson court made no reference to a de novo appellate review
standard.155
The Maryland Court of Appeals and the Court of Special Appeals
also considered Daubert precedent to support a Frye/Reed analysis on
148. See id. at 216–17, 803 A.2d at 1048–49 (discussing the trial judge’s wide latitude in
determining the qualification of an expert and whether such a determination was an abuse
of discretion).
149. Id. at 201 & n.5, 803 A.2d at 1039–40 & n.5.
150. Id. at 200, 803 A.2d at 1039; accord Montgomery Mutual Insurance Co. v. Chesson,
399 Md. 314, 327, 923 A.2d 939, 946 (2007). But see CSX Transp., Inc v. Miller, 159 Md.
App. 123, 183, 858 A.2d 1025, 1059 (2004) (criticizing Kumho “as a tediously fact-specific
‘tempest in a teapot,’ in large measure over whether the term ‘gatekeeper’ [could] be ap-
plied to characterize a judge ruling on the admissibility of expert opinion testimony” (em-
phasis added)), cert. granted, 384 Md. 581, 865 A.2d 589 (2005), cert. dismissed, 387 Md. 351,
875 A.2d 702 (2005).
151. 370 Md. 191, 803 A.2d 1034.  In Wilson, the Court of Appeals addressed expert
testimony that applied a product rule computation to determine the statistical improbabil-
ity that two siblings would die of Sudden Infant Death Syndrome (“SIDS”). Id. at 195, 803
A.2d at 1036.  The court found that the Frye/Reed standard applied because administration
of the product rule required two mutually independent events, and the court needed to
determine whether it was generally accepted that genetics played no role in SIDS, there-
fore making application of the product rule appropriate. Id. at 203, 206–09, 803 A.2d at
1041–44.  The court found it was not generally accepted that the deaths of two siblings by
SIDS were mutually independent events, and therefore held the trial judge erred in admit-
ting the testimony. Id. at 209, 803 A.2d at 1044.
152. Id. at 200, 803 A.2d at 1039.
153. 399 Md. 314, 923 A.2d 939.  In Chesson, the Court of Appeals addressed whether the
Circuit Court for Howard County abused its discretion by failing to hold a Frye/Reed hear-
ing upon petitioner’s challenge to respondent’s expert, who purported to establish a
causal connection between mold exposure and certain health effects. Id. at 317–18, 923
A.2d at 940–41.  The court held that the circuit court abused its discretion. Id. at 333, 923
A.2d at 950.  A court must conduct a Frye/Reed analysis when a medical expert’s opinion
evidence is based on an underlying scientific principle, “not presented as a scientific test
the results of which were controlled by inexorable, physical laws.” Id. at 330–32, 923 A.2d
at 948–49 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
154. Id. at 327, 923 A.2d at 946.
155. See id.
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several occasions.  In Wood v. Toyota Motor Corp.,156 appellant sought to
admit expert testimony concluding that the chemical burns she sus-
tained when her airbag deployed were caused by a design defect.157
Applying Rule 5-702, the Court of Special Appeals affirmed the trial
judge’s exclusion of the expert testimony because the expert had not
provided a rational explanation for how the data he relied upon led to
his conclusions.158  In support of this holding, the court referenced
the 2000 amendment to FRE 702 and opined that “[Maryland] case
law is consistent with the amendments to [FRE] 702.”159
Further, in Chesson, the Court of Appeals supported its applica-
tion of the Frye/Reed standard to expert medical testimony that at-
tempted to establish that mold exposure causes illness by reviewing
other Daubert and Frye jurisdictions that had evaluated the same is-
sue.160  Similarly, in Conaway v. Deane,161 the Court of Appeals assessed
whether homosexuality was an immutable characteristic and found
that no scientific or sociological study attempting to prove this fact
had “withstood analysis for evidentiary admissibility” in either Frye or
Daubert jurisdictions.162  The foregoing cases demonstrate Maryland
courts’ reliance on precedent from other jurisdictions in assessing the
reliability of novel scientific theories.
Finally, in Giant Food, Inc. v. Booker,163 the Court of Special Ap-
peals incorporated the language of FRE 702 into its Frye/Reed analysis.
In Giant Food, Inc., the court addressed whether the trial court accu-
rately admitted appellee’s expert testimony that found that exposure
to Freon caused appellee’s adult onset asthma.164  In reversing the
trial court’s admissibility determination, the court held that “the ex-
pert’s testimony lacked a sufficient factual basis, and the opinion was
not the product of reliable principles and methods.”165  The court ac-
knowledged that the latter phrase was taken from FRE 702, but explic-
itly reaffirmed its adherence to the Frye/Reed standard.166  The court
noted the similarities between Rule 5-702 and FRE 702 and reasoned
156. 134 Md. App. 512, 760 A.2d 315 (2000), cert. denied, 362 Md. 189, 763 A.2d 735
(2000).
157. Id. at 515, 760 A.2d at 317.
158. Id. at 523–24, 760 A.2d at 321–22.
159. Id. at 523 n.13, 760 A.2d at 322 n.13.
160. 399 Md. at 330–31, 923 A.2d at 948.
161. 401 Md. 219, 932 A.2d 571 (2007).
162. Id. at 292 & n.57, 932 A.2d at 615 & n.57.
163. 152 Md. App. 166, 831 A.2d 481 (2003), cert. denied, 378 Md. 614, 837 A.2d 926
(2003).
164. Id. at 178, 831 A.2d at 487–88.
165. Id. at 171, 190, 831 A.2d at 483, 494–95.
166. Id. at 183–84 & n.11, 831 A.2d at 491 & n.11.
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that Maryland case law pursuant to Rule 5-702 required such a foun-
dation, despite the language’s absence from the rule.167
III. THE COURT’S REASONING
In Blackwell v. Wyeth,168 the Court of Appeals of Maryland found
the Blackwells’ proffered expert testimony inadmissible because the
epidemiology expert’s methodology, theory, and analytical framework
were not generally accepted within the relevant scientific commu-
nity,169 and further found that the experts were unqualified to testify
as to disease causation pursuant to Maryland Rule of Evidence 5-
702.170  Writing for a unanimous court, Judge Battaglia began by ad-
dressing the application of the Frye/Reed standard171 to novel scientific
theories.172  Novel scientific theories must be valid and reliable prior
to a trial court admitting expert testimony discussing those theo-
ries.173  The court explained that Frye/Reed’s “general acceptance”
within the relevant scientific community standard “reflect[ed an] as-
sessment of a theory’s validity and reliability,174 and required “trial
judges [to engage] in a serious gate-keeping function, to differentiate
serious science from ‘junk science.’”175  The court noted that applica-
tion of the Frye/Reed standard retarded the admission of novel scien-
tific theories, but suggested a litigant was entitled to reliable and
accepted scientific judgment prior to scientific testimony being used
against him.176
The court did not assess all of the Blackwells’ experts pursuant to
the Frye/Reed standard.  Rather, the court only performed a Frye/Reed
analysis for the Blackwells’ proffered epidemiological expert, Dr.
Mark Geier.177  Dr. Geier’s studies involved generally accepted “un-
derlying data and methods for gathering this data . . . to support a
novel theory”178 that exposure to thimerosal-containing vaccines
167. Id. (citing Wood v. Toyota Motor Corp., 134 Md. App. 512, 523–24 & n.13, 760
A.2d 315, 321–22 & n.13 (2000), cert. denied, 362 Md. 189, 763 A.2d 735 (2000)).
168. 408 Md. 575, 971 A.2d 235 (2009).
169. Id. at 617–18, 971 A.2d at 261.
170. Id. at 630, 971 A.2d at 268.
171. See supra note 21 and accompanying text. R
172. Blackwell, 408 Md. at 580–81, 971 A.2d at 238.
173. Id. at 584, 971 A.2d at 240–41.
174. Id. at 585, 971 A.2d at 241.
175. Id. at 591, 971 A.2d at 245.
176. Id. at 586–87, 971 A.2d at 242.
177. Id. at 600 & n.18, 971 A.2d at 250 & n.18.
178. Id. at 596, 971 A.2d at 247–48.
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causes autism.179  The court reasoned, however, that it needed to scru-
tinize the methodology and analysis employed in interpreting the data,
even if the underlying data is generally accepted.180
Turning first to Dr. Geier’s methodologies, the court stated that
the relevant scientific community believed Dr. Geier’s studies inappro-
priately interpreted data produced by adverse events reporting
databases.181  Specifically, the relevant scientific community found Dr.
Geier’s studies arbitrarily linked acute vaccine reactions like fever,
pain, and vomiting to the occurrence of autism,182 and erroneously
assigned those reporting patients who received thimerosal-containing
vaccines a higher cumulative thimerosal total than patients who re-
ceived non-thimerosal-containing vaccines.183  Further, Dr. Geier’s
studies lacked transparency regarding his methods and data, making
it difficult to evaluate the findings.184  Accordingly, the 2001 National
Academy of Sciences’ Institute of Medicine Committee Report con-
cluded Dr. Geier’s hypothesis was not supported by clinical or experi-
mental evidence.185  The court also found that after considering
relevant studies and publications, the 2004 Committee readdressed
the issue and concluded that the evidence favored a rejection of the
hypothesis.186  Various other members of the relevant scientific com-
munity, the American Academy of Pediatrics, the Center for Disease
Control and Prevention, the Global Advisory Committee on Vaccine
179. Id. at 600, 971 A.2d at 250.  Dr. Geier’s studies utilized the following third-party
databases: Vaccine Adverse Event Reporting System, the Vaccine Safety Datalink, the De-
partment of Education database, and the California Department of Social Services
database. Id.
180. Id. at 604–05, 608, 971 A.2d at 253, 255.  This court had not previously addressed
the application of the Frye/Reed standard to this situation. Id. at 604, 971 A.2d at 253. The
court, however, found support in persuasive precedent of other federal and state courts.
Id. at 604–08, 971 A.2d at 253–55 (citing Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997);
Goeb v. Tharaldson, 615 N.W.2d 800 (Minn. 2000)).
181. Id. at 601, 971 A.2d at 250–51 (quoting INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADS., IMMUNI-
ZATION SAFETY REVIEW: VACCINES AND AUTISM 59 n.18 (2004), available at http://www.nap.
edu/catalog.php?record_id=10997 [hereinafter 2004 IOM COMMITTEE REPORT]).
182. Id., 971 A.2d at 251 (quoting American Academy of Pediatrics, Study Fails to Show
a Connection Between Thimerosal and Autism (May 16, 2003), http://www.aap.org/
profed/thimaut-may03.htm [hereinafter AAP May 2003 Posting]).
183. Id. at 601–02, 971 A.2d at 251.
184. Id. at 602, 971 A.2d at 251 (quoting 2004 IOM COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 181, R
at 62).
185. Id. at 597–98, 971 A.2d at 248–49 (quoting INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADS.,
IMMUNIZATION SAFETY REVIEW: THIMEROSAL-CONTAINING VACCINES AND NEUROLOGICAL DIS-
ORDERS 3–4 (2001), available at http://books.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=10208).
186. Id. at 598–99, 971 A.2d at 249 (citing 2004 IOM COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note
181, at 1). R
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Safety, and the National Institutes of Health also rejected the hypothe-
sis proffered by Dr. Geier.187
The relevant scientific community also rejected Dr. Geier’s novel
theory, that thimerosal-containing vaccines cause autism in genetically
susceptible individuals, and analytical framework.188  According to the
court, a generally accepted methodology must be coupled with a gen-
erally accepted analysis to avoid “analytical gap” concerns.189  Dr.
Geier’s analytical framework was predicated on his unreliable theory
that autism was associated with certain genetic polymorphisms that
made an individual genetically susceptible to autism.190  Dr. Geier
sought to prove this theory through a differential diagnoses analy-
sis.191  Differential diagnosis is an analytical tool that determines cau-
sation by ruling out other probable causes.192  Finding support from
federal courts, the court claimed that generally, differential diagnoses
cannot prove general causation.193  Before conducting a differential
diagnosis, a scientist must have reason to “rule in” a particular cause—
that is, a scientist must have previously proven general causation—and
Dr. Geier improperly “rule[d] in” thimerosal.194  According to the
court, the tests performed by Dr. Geier within the differential diagno-
sis were not generally accepted methods for diagnosing or determin-
187. Id. at 600, 971 A.2d at 250.  The court noted that the only publications supporting
Dr. Geier’s studies and his hypothesis were those written by himself and his son. Id. at
600–01, 971 A.2d at 250.
188. Id. at 611–12, 971 A.2d at 256–57.
189. Id. at 608, 971 A.2d at 255.  The court relied on General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S.
136 (1997):
[C]onclusions and methodology are not entirely distinct from one another. . . .
[N]othing in either Daubert or the Federal Rules of Evidence requires a district
court to admit opinion evidence that is connected to existing data only by the ipse
dixit of the expert.  A court may conclude that there is simply too great an analyti-
cal gap between the data and the opinion proffered.
Blackwell, 408 Md. at 606, 971 A.2d at 253–54 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Joiner, 522 U.S.
at 146).
190. Blackwell, 408 Md. at 608, 611–14, 971 A.2d at 255–59.  Genetic polymorphisms are
variations in the DNA too common to be new mutations. Id. at 615 n.26, 971 A.2d at 259
n.26.  Specifically, Dr. Geier considered “the A1298C polymorphism in the MTHFR gene,
the null polymorphism of the GSTMI gene, the I105V polymorphism of the GSTPI gene,
the I114T, R197Q, and K268R polymorphisms in the NATZ gene, and an unspecified vari-
ant in the CYP3A4 gene.” Id. at 611, 971 A.2d at 256–57.
191. Id. at 614–15, 971 A.2d at 259.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 616, 971 A.2d at 259–60 (citing Ruggiero v. Warner-Lambert Co., 424 F.3d
249, 254 (2d Cir. 2005); Doe v. Ortho-Clinical Diagnostics, Inc., 440 F. Supp. 2d 465, 477
(M.D.N.C. 2006)).
194. Id.
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ing the causes of autism,195 and Dr. Geier also failed to consider the
most prevalent alleged cause of autism, an unknown genetic
etiology.196
Finally, the court addressed the qualifications of the experts prof-
fered by the Blackwells pursuant to Rule 5-702.197  The court consid-
ered two factors in its analysis: (1) whether the field of expertise was
complex; and (2) how central this field was to the resolution of the
lawsuit.198  The court agreed with the conclusion of the Circuit Court
for Baltimore City, issued by Judge Berger, that epidemiology was the
most relevant scientific field relating to disease causation.199  The
court found the field of epidemiology to be complex200 and that the
existence of a causal relationship between thimerosal-containing vac-
cines and autism was dispositive of the lawsuit.201  None of the
Blackwells’ proffered experts were epidemiologists.202  The experts
were qualified to discuss the adverse effects of mercury203 and thimer-
osal on the human brain,204 and autism diagnoses in general,205 but
these experts lacked the necessary experiences or education needed
to determine whether thimerosal exposure causes autism.206
IV. ANALYSIS
In Blackwell v. Wyeth, the Court of Appeals of Maryland held the
Blackwells’ proffered expert testimony inadmissible because the epi-
demiological expert’s novel methodology, theory, and analytical
framework were not “generally accepted” within the relevant scientific
community as required by Frye/Reed,207 and the remaining experts
were unqualified to address disease causation under Maryland Rule of
Evidence 5-702.208  In so holding, the court correctly excluded the ex-
pert testimony,209 but significantly collapsed its analysis of Maryland’s
195. Id. at 615, 971 A.2d at 259.  Dr. Geier performed urinary porphyrin, mercury toxic-
ity, testosterone, and genetic polymorphism tests. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 618, 971 A.2d at 261.
198. Id. at 629, 971 A.2d at 267.
199. Id. at 623–24, 971 A.2d at 264.  The court also found support for this conclusion in
the 2004 IOM Committee Report. Id. at 624, 971 A.2d at 264.
200. Id. at 629, 971 A.2d at 267.
201. Id. at 630, 971 A.2d at 268.
202. Id. at 624, 630, 971 A.2d at 264–65, 268.
203. Id. at 625, 971 A.2d at 265.
204. Id. at 625–26, 971 A.2d at 265.
205. Id. at 626, 971 A.2d at 265–66.
206. Id. at 630, 971 A.2d at 268.
207. Id. at 585, 608–09, 617–18, 971 A.2d at 241, 255, 260–61.
208. Id. at 618, 630, 971 A.2d at 261, 268.
209. See infra Part IV.A.
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Frye/Reed standard into the federal Daubert standard.210  In particular,
the court considered several Daubert factors and supported its reason-
ing with Daubert precedent.211  The court should have expressly
adopted the Daubert standard to account for differences in the follow-
ing: (1) potential arguments raised by litigants, (2) the role of judges
in determining the admissibility of expert testimony, and (3) the ap-
pellate review standards pursuant to either standard.  Such an ac-
knowledgement would avoid inconsistent applications of the expert
testimony admissibility standard in Maryland courts212 and allow trial
judges to truly consider the scientific evidence at issue.213
A. The Court of Appeals Correctly Excluded the Blackwells’ Expert
Testimony Pursuant to Frye/Reed and Rule 5-702
In addition to the requirements of Rule 5-702, which govern all
expert testimony, expert testimony discussing novel scientific theories
must meet the minimum threshold Frye/Reed standard to be admissi-
ble.214  Therefore, a court may exclude expert testimony because the
novel scientific theory was not generally accepted within the relevant
scientific community or because the expert was not qualified to testify
as to that particular subject.  The court correctly excluded the
Blackwells’ epidemiological expert pursuant to the Frye/Reed standard
and the remaining experts pursuant to Rule 5-702.215
1. The Court Properly Held that Dr. Geier’s Methodology, Theory,
and Analytical Framework Were Not “Generally Accepted”
Within the Relevant Scientific Community
The court correctly excluded Dr. Geier’s expert testimony be-
cause the relevant scientific community did not generally accept his
210. See infra Part IV.B.
211. See infra text accompanying notes 244–69. R
212. See infra Part IV.C.1–2.
213. See infra Part IV.C.3.
214. See Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374, 389, 391 A.2d 364, 372 (1978) (stating that testi-
mony based on a generally accepted technique will still only be admitted “if a trial judge
also determines in the exercise of his discretion . . . that the proposed testimony will be
helpful to the jury, that the expert is properly qualified, etc.”); JOSEPH F. MURPHY & PAUL
W. GRIMM, MURPHY & GRIMM’S COMPARATIVE GUIDE TO THE MARYLAND & FEDERAL RULES OF
EVIDENCE 238 (2007) (“[I]n [Maryland] state court, there is a dual track that is followed.
For all expert testimony involving matters that do not implicate novel scientific issues, Rule
5-702, as interpreted by the courts of appeals governs.  For novel scientific evidence, the
Reed case applies.”). When the Court of Appeals adopted the Rule 5-702, it expressly stated
“[t]his Rule is not intended to overrule Reed v. State.” MD. R. 5-702 committee’s note; see
also LYNN MCLAIN, MARYLAND RULES OF EVIDENCE 160 (2007) (“The Committee note makes
clear that the Court of Appeals’ adoption of Rule 5-702 did not overrule Reed v. State . . . .”).
215. See infra Part IV.A.1–2.
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methodology, theory, or analytical framework.  The identity of the rel-
evant scientific community depends upon the particular technique at
issue and generally “include[s] those whose scientific background and
training are sufficient to allow them to comprehend and understand
the process and form a judgment about it.”216  The court found that
the National Academy of Sciences’ Institute of Medicine (“IOM”), the
Center for Disease Control and Prevention (“CDC”), the Global Advi-
sory Committee on Vaccine Safety, the American Academy of Pediat-
rics, and the National Institutes of Health all refuted the existence of a
causal connection between thimerosal-containing vaccines and au-
tism.217  The court correctly concluded that these government institu-
tions and private groups represented the relevant scientific
community for its Frye/Reed analysis.  The IOM is an independent,
nonprofit organization that “asks and answers the nation’s most press-
ing questions about health and health care . . . to help those in gov-
ernment and the private sector make informed health decisions by
providing evidence upon which they can rely.”218  The CDC sets forth
recommended immunization schedules219 and analyzes the Vaccine
Adverse Event Reporting System (“VAERS”) data in conjunction with
the Food and Drug Administration for the reporting of adverse events
subsequent to vaccine administration.220  The World Health Organiza-
tion established the Global Advisory Committee on Vaccine Safety in
1999 to “respond promptly, efficiently, and with scientific rigour to
vaccine safety issues of potential global importance.”221  The Ameri-
can Academy of Pediatrics is “an organization of 60,000 pediatricians
committed to the attainment of optimal physical, mental, and social
health and well-being for all infants, children, adolescents, and young
adults.”222  Finally, the National Institutes of Health, “the steward of
medical and behavioral research for the Nation,” pursues “fundamen-
tal knowledge about the nature and behavior of living systems and the
application of that knowledge to extend healthy life and reduce the
216. Reed, 283 Md. at 382, 391 A.2d at 368.
217. Blackwell v. Wyeth, 408 Md. 575, 599–600, 971 A.2d 235, 249–50 (2009).
218. Institute of Medicine of the National Academies, About the IOM, http://www.iom.
edu/About-IOM.aspx (last visited Mar. 28, 2010).
219. Center for Disease Control and Prevention, Immunization Schedules, http://www.
cdc.gov/vaccines/recs/schedules/default.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2010).
220. Center for Disease Control and Prevention, Vaccine Safety and Adverse Events,
http://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/vac-gen/safety/default.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2010).
221. World Health Organization, Global Advisory Committee on Vaccine Safety, http://
www.who.int/vaccine_safety/en (last visited Mar. 28, 2010).
222. American Academy of Pediatrics, About AAP, http://www.aap.org/about.html (last
visited Mar. 28, 2010).
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burdens of illness and disability.”223  Based on the purposes and ex-
periences of the foregoing government institutions and private
groups, the court accurately considered them to be the relevant scien-
tific community.
The court correctly concluded that the relevant scientific commu-
nity did not “generally accept” Dr. Geier’s methodology, theory, and
analytical framework.  Regarding Dr. Geier’s methodology, the 2004
IOM Committee Report reviewed “the extant published and unpub-
lished epidemiological studies regarding causality and studies of po-
tential biologic mechanisms by which these immunizations might
cause autism,”224 and criticized Dr. Geier’s use of the VAERS database
because it lacked “complete reporting of all adverse events and be-
cause many report events lack[ed] a confirmed diagnosis or con-
firmed attribution to vaccine.”225  As to Dr. Geier’s genetic
susceptibility theory, the 2001 and 2004 IOM Committee Reports ac-
cepted that a biological correlation between genetics and autism was
possible, but the court found that none of the specific polymorphisms
cited by Dr. Geier was accepted by the relevant scientific commu-
nity.226  Finally, Dr. Geier’s differential diagnosis omitted an unknown
genetic etiology from the list of possible causes of autism,227 and the
2004 IOM Committee Report specifically opined that “[a] strong ge-
netic component clearly exists,” even though “a biological marker spe-
cific for autism has not been defined.”228  Dr. Geier’s failure to
consider this possibility rendered his analytical framework unaccept-
able by the relevant scientific community.229  Thus, the court correctly
excluded Dr. Geier’s expert testimony because his methodology, the-
ory, and analytical framework were not generally accepted within the
relevant scientific community.
223. National Institutes of Health, About NIH, http://nih.gov/about/#mission (last vis-
ited Mar. 28, 2010).
224. 2004 IOM COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 181, at 1. R
225. Id. at 59 n.18.
226. Blackwell v. Wyeth, 408 Md. 575, 611–14, 971 A.2d 235, 256–59 (2009); see also 2004
IOM COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 181, at 139 (finding “no corroborating data . . . link- R
ing vaccines or vaccine components to autism based on genetic susceptibility”).
227. Blackwell, 408 Md. at 615, 971 A.2d at 259.
228. 2004 IOM COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 181, at 8. R
229. Blackwell, 408 Md. at 616–17, 971 A.2d at 260.
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2. The Court Properly Found that Dr. Geier and the Blackwells’
Remaining Experts Were Unqualified to Testify as to Disease
Causation Pursuant to Rule 5-702
The court also correctly excluded the Blackwells’ remaining ex-
perts, as well as Dr. Geier’s testimony, because they were unqualified
to testify as to disease causation pursuant to Rule 5-702.  According to
Rule 5-702(1), the court must determine “whether the witness is quali-
fied as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or educa-
tion.”230  In mass tort cases, plaintiffs must prove general and specific
causation—exposure to the substance can cause harm to an individual
and in fact did cause the plaintiff’s particular injury.231  Epidemiologi-
cal studies can provide proof of general causation by “compar[ing]
the incidence of defects among groups of persons exposed to a drug
to groups of persons not exposed” or by “match[ing] those who have
injury with others who are uninjured and compar[ing] the two
groups’ frequency of exposure to the drug.”232  Therefore, the court
correctly concluded that epidemiology was the necessary qualification
to assess medical and disease causation.233  While the court consid-
ered Dr. Geier’s testimony pursuant to the Frye/Reed standard because
he was proffered as an epidemiological expert, it ultimately concluded
he was not qualified because he lacked training in both epidemiology
and toxicology.234  The remaining experts were excluded for similar
reasons.235
230. MD. R. 5-702(1).
231. Joseph Sanders, From Science to Evidence: The Testimony on Causation in the Bendectin
Cases, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1, 14 (1993).
232. Id. at 14, 22.
233. Other courts have also concluded that epidemiology is the critical field to assess
medical causation. See, e.g., Richardson v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 857 F.2d 823, 830
(D.C. Cir. 1988) (“When [epidemiological] studies are available and relevant, and particu-
larly when they are numerous and span a significant period of time, they assume a very
important role in determinations of questions of causation.”), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 882
(1989); In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1223, 1231 (E.D.N.Y. 1985)
(finding epidemiological studies to be “the only useful studies having any bearing on cau-
sation”), aff’d, 818 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1234 (1988); In re Swine
Flu Immunization Prods. Liab. Litig., 508 F. Supp. 897, 907 (D. Colo. 1981) (“[W]here . . .
the exact organic cause of a disease cannot be scientifically isolated, epidemiologic data
becomes highly persuasive.”), aff’d sub nom. Lima v. United States, 708 F.2d 502 (10th Cir.
1983).
234. Blackwell, 408 Md. at 624–25, 630, 971 A.2d at 265, 268.
235. Id. at 630, 971 A.2d at 268.
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B. The Court of Appeals Collapsed the Frye/Reed Standard into the
Daubert Standard by Relying on Daubert Precedent and
Considering Several “Daubert Factors” to Exclude Dr.
Geier’s Testimony
The Court of Appeals’s assessment of Dr. Geier’s testimony did
not simply rely on the absence of general acceptance in the relevant
scientific community regarding his theory that thimerosal-containing
vaccines can cause autism.  Instead, the court articulated a Daubert
“gatekeeping” role for trial judges, and significantly collapsed Mary-
land’s Frye/Reed standard into the federal Daubert standard by consid-
ering several Daubert factors and relying upon Daubert precedent.
Since “general acceptance” is a Daubert factor, the Court of Appeals
arguably completed a Frye/Reed analysis in name only and assessed Dr.
Geier’s expert testimony pursuant to the Daubert standard.  This col-
lapse changes both the arguments litigants ought to raise in support
of or against admissibility of expert testimony discussing novel scien-
tific theories, and the role of trial judges in evaluating such evidence.
According to the Blackwell court’s articulation of Frye/Reed juris-
prudence, “trial judges [engage] in a serious gate-keeping function, to
differentiate serious science from ‘junk science.’”236  The court fur-
ther asserted that “[c]ommentators on the Frye standard have recog-
nized the importance of this [gatekeeping] role: ‘Courts therefore
have a duty to ensure that experts are presenting reliable testi-
mony.’”237  This latter statement was taken out of context by the
court.  In the article from which the court was quoting, author David
E. Bernstein argued for the rejection of Frye and adoption of
Daubert.238  Bernstein criticized the reasoning behind Frye’s limited ap-
plicability to scientific evidence only, specifically the risk that juries
will consider scientific evidence infallible.239  Instead, Bernstein ar-
gued the risk was present with any expert witness, therefore necessitat-
ing the trial judge’s gatekeeping role for non-scientific expert
testimony as well.240  In Daubert, the Supreme Court first articulated
236. Id. at 591, 971 A.2d at 245.
237. Id. at 591–93, 971 A.2d at 245–46 (citing and quoting David E. Bernstein, Frye,
Frye, Again: The Past, Present, and Future of the General Acceptance Test, 41 JURIMETRICS J. 385,
402–03 (2001)).
238. Bernstein, supra note 237, at 404 (“A better solution would be for Frye jurisdictions R
to adopt amended Federal Rule of Evidence 702, which incorporates the holding of the
Supreme Court’s expert evidence trilogy.”).
239. Id. at 401–02.
240. See id. at 403 (stating that the Supreme Court has likewise recognized that all ex-
pert testimony should “be subjected to a reliability test” (citing Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmi-
chael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999))).
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the trial judge’s gatekeeping role: The trial judge must screen expert
testimony to ensure all scientific testimony and evidence is relevant
and reliable.241  For the Maryland Court of Appeals to include a refer-
ence to the trial judge “gatekeeper” role is an unstated affirmation of
Daubert242 and rejection of Reed.  In Reed, the court specifically stated
that “it [was] . . . inappropriate to view” the reliability of new scientific
techniques “as a matter within each trial judge’s individual discre-
tion.”243  By deeming the trial judge a “gatekeeper,” the Blackwell
court changed the role of the trial judge in determining the admissi-
bility of novel scientific expert testimony in Maryland courts.
Further, the court directly considered the science to specifically
explain why the relevant scientific community rejected Dr. Geier’s
studies.  By addressing the reasoning behind the relevant scientific
community’s rejection of Dr. Geier’s methodology, theory, and analyt-
ical framework, the Blackwell court considered several Daubert and FRE
702 factors.  First, the court considered whether Dr. Geier’s epidemio-
logical studies could be “tested.”244  The court cited the 2004 IOM
Committee’s finding that “[Dr. Geier’s] articles [lacked] a complete
and transparent description of their methods and underlying data,
making it difficult to confirm or evaluate their findings,” and the find-
ing that the “the results [were] uninterpretable, primarily due to the
lack of a complete description of their methods.”245  In other words,
Dr. Geier’s method was not “testable” given the lack of transparency.
The court also considered the “potential rate of error”246 of Dr.
Geier’s studies.247  The American Academy of Pediatrics did not ac-
cept Dr. Geier’s studies because his faulty comparison of “late onset,
chronic conditions like autism [with] acute vaccine reactions like fe-
241. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589, 597 (1993); see
also United States v. Prince-Oyibo, 320 F.3d 494, 498 (4th Cir. 2003) (“In Daubert, the Su-
preme Court made clear that it is the duty of the trial court to perform the gatekeeping
function with respect to expert testimony . . . .”).
242. See 4 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE
§ 702.05[1][b] (Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., 2d ed. 2009) (noting that “the 2000 amend-
ments to [FRE] 702 codify the principle that trial courts must perform their gatekeeping
role for all proffered expert testimony”).
243. Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374, 381, 391 A.2d 364, 367 (1978) (emphasis added).
244. Blackwell v. Wyeth, 408 Md. 575, 601, 602, 971 A.2d 235, 251 (2009); see also
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593 (setting forth “testability” as one of the inquiries to determine
admissibility of scientific evidence).
245. Blackwell, 408 Md. at 602, 971 A.2d at 251 (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted).
246. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594 (setting forth “potential rate of error” as one of the
inquiries to determine admissibility of scientific evidence).
247. See Blackwell, 408 Md. at 602, 971 A.2d at 251 (discussing the 2004 IOM Committee
Report’s findings and noting the improbability of the results of Dr. Geier’s studies).
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ver, pain, and vomiting” was a serious methodological flaw; there was
no indication one corresponded to the other.248  Further, in Dr.
Geier’s studies comparing thimerosal-containing and thimerosal-free
vaccines, he assigned a higher cumulative mercury exposure total for
the former vaccines without actual knowledge of exposure data.249
The court’s articulation of serious methodological flaws is indicative
of a serious “potential rate of error.”250
The court also arguably considered two factors discussed in the
FRE 702 Advisory Committee’s note: (1) “[w]hether the expert has
unjustifiably extrapolated from an accepted premise to an unfounded
conclusion”; and (2) “[w]hether the expert has adequately accounted
for obvious alternative explanations.”251  According to the court, Dr.
Geier’s genetic susceptibility theory “was apparently inspired by state-
ments made in the 2001 and 2004 IOM Report,” suggesting that a
genetic cause for autism might exist.252  From this premise, Dr. Geier
posited that the A1298C polymorphism in the MTHFR gene was asso-
ciated with autism.253  At the Frye/Reed hearing, however, Judge Berger
found that this polymorphism, unlike autism, varied across ethnic
groups, and therefore could not be a genetic cause of the disease.254
Thus, it appears that the Blackwell court was troubled by the fact that
Dr. Geier “unjustifiably extrapolated” from the accepted premise that
a genetic cause for autism might exist to his unfounded conclusion
that thimerosal-containing vaccines caused autism in genetically sus-
ceptible individuals, specifically those with the A1298C polymorphism
in the MTHFR gene.
The court also found that Dr. Geier’s differential diagnosis, per-
formed to prove causation for his genetic susceptibility theory, failed
to consider an obvious alternative conclusion.  The court agreed with
Judge Berger’s finding that an unknown genetic etiology was the “‘sin-
gle most important alleged cause of autism’”255 and also agreed with
his conclusion that Dr. Geier’s differential diagnosis neglected to con-
sider this cause.256  Again, the court moved beyond whether the rele-
248. AAP May 2003 Posting, supra note 182. R
249. Blackwell, 408 Md. at 601–02, 971 A.2d at 251.
250. See supra note 246. R
251. FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note.
252. Blackwell, 408 Md. at 611, 971 A.2d at 256.
253. Id. at 611, 971 A.2d at 256–57.
254. Id. at 613, 971 A.2d at 258.
255. See id. at 615–17, 971 A.2d at 259–60 (quoting Blackwell v. Sigma Aldrich, Inc., No.
24-C-04-004829, slip op. at 33 (Md. Cir. Ct. Dec. 21, 2007), available at http://www.baltocts.
state.md.us/about/publications/opinions/blackwell_memorandum_opinion.pdf).
256. Id. at 617, 971 A.2d at 260.
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vant scientific community accepted Dr. Geier’s theory, and specifically
considered Daubert and FRE 702 factors to support its inadmissibility
holding.257
Interestingly, Judge Berger’s circuit court opinion also consid-
ered two other Daubert factors: (1) “whether the theory or technique
has been subjected to peer review and publication”;258 and (2) “the
existence and maintenance of standards controlling the technique’s
operation.”259  Judge Berger addressed defendant Wyeth’s contention
that the journals publishing Dr. Geier’s articles were “relatively ob-
scure or unknown journals that are not typically used to report signifi-
cant epidemiological studies.”260  Judge Berger also noted that Dr.
Geier purported to follow the CDC’s methodology interpreting
VAERS data in his studies, but in actuality, “there [were] significant
and material distinctions between the CDC studies and the Geier . . .
publications.”261  While these considerations were well-reasoned, and
the court was certainly correct in its holding, these findings signifi-
cantly depart from what is required pursuant to the Frye/Reed
standard.
In addition to considering several Daubert factors in its analysis of
Dr. Geier’s expert testimony, the Court of Appeals also relied on
Daubert precedent in two critical points in its reasoning.  First, in ana-
lyzing Dr. Geier’s differential diagnosis, the court noted the following:
“[W]e have not in the past had occasion to scrutinize the analytical
phase of a scientific process underlying a novel scientific opinion,
where the underlying data may otherwise be generally accepted in the
scientific community . . . .”262  To rationalize extending Frye/Reed to
include assessment of an expert’s analytical framework, the court re-
lied on General Electric Co. v. Joiner.263  In Joiner, the United States Su-
preme Court explained that a trial judge’s focus ought to be on the
expert’s principles and methodology and not his conclusions; how-
ever, there also cannot be “too great an analytical gap between the
data and the opinion proffered.”264  Therefore, the Blackwell court
proceeded to scrutinize Dr. Geier’s analytical framework surrounding
the “generally accepted” VAERS data because “generally accepted
257. See supra text accompanying notes 244–56. R
258. See supra text accompanying note 93. R
259. See supra text accompanying note 95. R
260. Blackwell, No. 24-C-04-004829, slip op. at 24.
261. Id. at 25.
262. Blackwell v. Wyeth, 408 Md. 575, 604–05, 971 A.2d 235, 253 (2009).
263. Id. at 605–06, 971 A.2d at 253–54 (citing Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136
(1997)).
264. Joiner, 522 U.S. at 146.
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methodology . . . must be coupled with generally accepted analysis in
order to avoid the pitfalls of an ‘analytical gap.’”265  The court then
cited two Daubert cases, originally cited by Judge Berger, that lent sup-
port to Judge Berger’s ultimate rejection of Dr. Geier’s utilization of
differential diagnoses.266  According to Ruggiero v. Warner-Lambert
Co.267 and Doe v. Ortho-Clinical Diagnostics, Inc.,268 both Daubert cases,
differential diagnosis should not be used to prove general
causation.269
While the above findings were all relevant pursuant to a Daubert
analysis, they are unnecessary pursuant to a strict Frye/Reed analysis.
On the one hand, Frye/Reed permits judges to rely upon the assertions
of the relevant scientific community.270 Daubert, on the other hand,
demands an investigation into the underlying science prior to admis-
sion.271  It is apparent that the Blackwell court performed the latter in
this case.  To account for this shift in the court’s analysis, litigants
must be prepared to argue for or against the actual science employed
by the proffered expert and not simply discuss its acceptance or rejec-
tion by the relevant scientific community.  Such a shift also alters the
role of the trial judge in assessing the admissibility of expert testimony
discussing novel scientific theories.  Both Judge Berger and the Court
of Appeals considered more than the relevant scientific community’s
ultimate conclusion regarding Dr. Geier’s testimony, and specifically
addressed why Dr. Geier’s methodology, theory, and analytical frame-
work were not “generally accepted.”
265. Blackwell, 408 Md. at 608, 971 A.2d at 255 (quoting Joiner, 522 U.S. at 146).
266. Id. at 615–16, 617, 971 A.2d at 259, 260 (citing Ruggiero v. Warner-Lambert Co.,
424 F.3d 249 (2d Cir. 2005); Doe v. Ortho-Clinical Diagnostics, Inc., 440 F. Supp. 2d 465
(M.D.N.C. 2006)); Blackwell, No. 24-C-04-004829, slip op. at 48 (citing these same cases).
267. 424 F.3d 249.
268. 440 F. Supp. 2d 465.
269. Ruggiero, 424 F.3d at 253, 254 (“[T]his method does not (necessarily) support an
opinion on general causation, because, like any process of elimination, it assumes that the
final, suspected cause remaining after this process of elimination must actually be capable
of causing the injury.” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)); Ortho-Clinical
Diagnostics, Inc., 440 F. Supp. 2d at 469, 477 (“Generally, it is not appropriate to rely on a
differential diagnosis to prove general causation.”).
270. See supra Part II.A.1.
271. See supra Part II.B.
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C. The Court of Appeals Should Have Acknowledged Frye/Reed’s
Collapse into Daubert in Maryland Case Law and Replaced the
Frye/Reed Standard with Daubert to Avoid Inconsistencies in
Both Application and Appellate Review Standards, and to Promote a
True “Gatekeeper” Role for Trial Judges
In the wake of Daubert, several states have either adopted the en-
tire Daubert trilogy,272 portions of the Daubert trilogy,273 or found the
Daubert trilogy instructive.274  Arguably, Maryland falls into the final
category, as Maryland case law has merged with the federal Daubert
standard by relying upon Daubert precedent and considering several
Daubert factors in its exclusion of expert testimony in Blackwell.275  To
avoid inconsistent applications of expert testimony admissibility stan-
dards276 and the different appellate standards of review required by
Frye/Reed and Daubert,277 the Court of Appeals should have adopted
the Daubert standard because of its broader applicability and true
“gatekeeper” role for trial judges, which permits actual consideration
of the science behind expert testimony.278
1. The Court of Appeals Should Have Acknowledged Frye/Reed’s
Collapse into Daubert and Replaced the Frye/Reed Standard
with Daubert to Avoid Inconsistent Applications of Expert
Admissibility Standards in Maryland Courts
While continuing to state adherence to Frye/Reed,279 the Maryland
Court of Special Appeals and the Maryland Court of Appeals have
found Daubert instructive on several occasions,280 culminating in the
Blackwell court’s reliance on Joiner and the Daubert factors in excluding
272. David E. Bernstein & Jeffrey D. Jackson, The Daubert Trilogy in the States, 44
JURIMETRICS J. 351, 357 (2004).
273. Id. at 357–58.
274. Id. at 361.
275. See supra Part IV.B.
276. See infra Part IV.C.1.
277. See infra Part IV.C.2.
278. See infra Part IV.C.3.
279. See Wilson v. State, 370 Md. 191, 201, 803 A.2d 1034, 1039 (2002) (“[T]his Court
adopted the standard set forth in Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923), for
determining the admissibility of scientific evidence and expert testimony.”); Burral v. State,
352 Md. 707, 737–38, 724 A.2d 65, 80 (1999) (stating that despite the Supreme Court’s
rejection of Frye, “we have not abandoned Frye or Reed”); Giant Food, Inc. v. Booker, 152
Md. App. 166, 184 n.11, 831 A.2d 481, 491 n.11 (2002) (“Maryland courts still adhere to
the Reed-Frye ‘general acceptance’ standard.” (citations omitted)), cert. denied, 378 Md. 614,
837 A.2d 926 (2003).
280. See Wood v. Toyota Motor Corp., 134 Md. App. 512, 523 n.13, 760 A.2d 315, 322
n.13 (2000) (“[Maryland] case law is consistent with the amendments to Rule 702 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence.”), cert. denied, 362 Md. 189, 763 A.2d 735 (2000); Giant Food,
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Dr. Geier’s testimony.281  This inclusion and deference to Daubert,
however, has not been uniform throughout Maryland courts.  There-
fore, the Court of Appeals should have adopted Daubert to maintain
consistency in the application of expert testimony admissibility
standards.
In recent years, the trend in Maryland courts has been toward
greater acceptance of the trial judge’s “gatekeeper” role in assessing
the admissibility of expert testimony.  Beginning with Wilson v.
State,282 the Court of Appeals stated that trial judges had “wide latitude
in determining whether expert testimony is sufficiently reliable to be
admissible” pursuant to Rule 5-702.283  Five years later, in Montgomery
Mutual Insurance Co. v. Chesson,284 the court referenced the trial
judge’s “wide latitude” in assessing the reliability of expert testimony,
and further articulated that the Frye/Reed standard required both gen-
eral acceptance in the scientific community and a reliable method.285
This trend culminated in Blackwell when the court stated “our [Frye/
Reed] jurisprudence engages trial judges in a serious gate-keeping
function.”286
This trend, however, has not been consistent.  In CSX Transporta-
tion, Inc. v. Miller,287 the Court of Special Appeals criticized Kumho Tire
Co. v. Carmichael288 “as a tediously fact-specific ‘tempest in a teapot,’ in
large measure over whether the term ‘gatekeeper’ [could] be applied
to characterize a judge ruling on the admissibility of expert opinion
testimony.”289  According to the court, the term “gatekeeper” seemed
to be “loaded with some sort of magical cachet,”290 highlighting that
not all Maryland courts embraced this role for trial judges making
evidence admissibility determinations.  Whether a judge performs a
“gatekeeper” role and assesses the science prior to admission of expert
testimony or whether a judge simply defers to the relevant scientific
Inc., 152 Md. App. at 183–84, 831 A.2d at 491 (using language from FRE 702 to describe
Maryland’s approach to the admissibility of scientific evidence).
281. See supra Part IV.B.
282. 370 Md. 191, 803 A.2d 1034.
283. Id. at 200, 803 A.2d at 1039.
284. 399 Md. 314, 923 A.2d 939 (2007).
285. Id. at 326–27, 923 A.2d at 946.
286. Blackwell v. Wyeth, 408 Md. 575, 591, 971 A.2d 235, 245 (2009).
287. 159 Md. App. 123, 858 A.2d 1025 (2004), cert. granted, 384 Md. 581, 865 A.2d 589
(2005), cert. dismissed, 387 Md. 351, 875 A.2d 702 (2005).
288. 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
289. CSX Transp., Inc., 159 Md. App. at 183, 858 A.2d at 1059 (citing Kumho, 526 U.S.
137).
290. Id.
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community are different functions for trial judges that the Court of
Appeals should reconcile.
Maryland courts’ consideration of Daubert precedent when con-
ducting a Frye/Reed analysis highlights a separate convergence trend
within Maryland case law.291  In Wood v. Toyota Motor Corp.,292 the
court referenced the 2000 amendment to FRE 702 and opined that
“[Maryland] case law is consistent with the amendments to Rule 702
of the Federal Rules of Evidence.”293  The Blackwell court adopted this
stance by relying on Joiner, Ortho-Clinical Diagnostics, Inc., and Ruggiero
to support its reasoning.294  This trend, however, is also inconsistent
within Maryland courts.  First, the 2000 amendment to FRE 702 refer-
enced in Wood derived in part from Kumho,295 and, as noted above, the
Court of Special Appeals rejected Kumho in CXS Transportation, Inc.296
The court in CXS Transportation, Inc., also criticized as highly question-
able the appellant’s reliance on the following: “1) Daubert . . . a Su-
preme Court case dealing exclusively with the federal law of evidence;
2) the Federal Rules of Evidence; and 3) lower federal court cases
dealing with the federal law of evidence.”297  These two different un-
derstandings of the relevance of Daubert precedent to a Frye/Reed anal-
ysis cannot be reconciled and necessitate a clear instruction from the
Court of Appeals.
291. Maryland courts have utilized Daubert precedent to support their Frye/Reed hold-
ings. See, e.g., Montgomery Mutual Ins. Co. v. Chesson, 399 Md. 314, 330–31, 923 A.2d 939,
948 (2007) (supporting its application of the Frye/Reed standard to expert medical testi-
mony attempting to establish that mold exposure causes illness by reviewing similar hold-
ings in Daubert and Frye jurisdictions); Conaway v. Deane, 401 Md. 219, 292–94 n.57, 932
A.2d 571, 615–16 n.57 (2007) (observing that no Frye or Daubert jurisdictions admitted
scientific or sociological studies attempting to prove that homosexuality was an immutable
characteristic).
292. 134 Md. App. 512, 760 A.2d 315 (2000), cert. denied, 362 Md. 189, 763 A.2d 735
(2000).
293. Id. at 523 n.13, 760 A.2d at 322 n.13.
294. See supra text accompanying notes 262–69. R
295. See FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note (explaining that the amendments
were a result of Daubert and other cases applying Daubert, including Kumho).
296. See supra notes 287–90 and accompanying text. R
297. CSX Transp., Inc v. Miller, 159 Md. App. 123, 182–83, 858 A.2d 1025, 1059 (2004),
cert. granted, 384 Md. 581, 865 A.2d 589 (2005), cert. dismissed, 387 Md. 351, 875 A.2d 702
(2005); see also supra note 142 (highlighting several Maryland cases articulating a contin- R
ued adherence to Frye/Reed).
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2. The Reasoning Behind Frye/Reed’s De Novo Appellate Review
Standard Does Not Translate to Maryland Courts’
Application of the Daubert Standard
The unstated collapse of Maryland’s Frye/Reed standard into the
federal Daubert standard fails to account for the differences in appel-
late review standards and the reasoning behind each.  Maryland
courts review trial judges’ Frye/Reed admissibility determinations de
novo.298 In Reed, the Court of Appeals of Maryland reasoned the
following:
The question of the reliability of a scientific technique or
process is unlike the question, for example, of the helpful-
ness of particular expert testimony to the trier of facts in a
specific case.  The answer to the question about the reliabil-
ity of a scientific technique or process does not vary accord-
ing to the circumstances of each case.  It is therefore
inappropriate to view this threshold question of reliability as
a matter within each trial judge’s individual discretion.299
In contrast, the United States Supreme Court in Joiner reasoned that a
trial judge’s gatekeeping role screening evidence necessitated an
abuse of discretion standard of review.300  According to the Joiner
Court, “[c]ases arise where it is very much a matter of discretion with the
court whether to receive or exclude the evidence; but the appellate
court will not reverse in such a case, unless the ruling is manifestly
erroneous.”301  In Blackwell, however, the court found Maryland’s Frye/
Reed jurisprudence to be consistent with a “gatekeeping” trial judge
role302 but reviewed Judge Berger’s Frye/Reed evidentiary determina-
tions de novo.303  This articulation is not consistent with the above
reasoning set forth in Joiner or Reed.304
298. Wilson v. State, 370 Md. 191, 201 n.5, 803 A.2d 1034, 1040 n.5 (2002).
299. Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374, 381, 391 A.2d 364, 367 (1978).
300. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 141–42 (1997).
301. Id. at 142 (emphasis added) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Spring Co. v. Edgar, 99 U.S. 645, 658 (1878)).
302. Blackwell v. Wyeth, 408 Md. 575, 591, 971 A.2d 235, 245 (2009).
303. Id. at 580 n.9, 971 A.2d at 238 n.9.
304. A gatekeeping approach to evidentiary determinations is not consistent with a de
novo standard of review. See, e.g., Brief for Aluminum Co. of America et al. as Amicus
Curiae in Support of Petitioners at *9–10, Gen. Elec. Co. v. Ingram, 513 U.S. 1190 (1995)
(No. 94-1070), 1995 WL 17107881 (arguing that “the Third Circuit’s one-way ‘hard look’
approach . . . will only undermine [the Supreme Court’s] ruling in Daubert and discourage
trial judges from continuing to follow its mandate to act as gatekeepers.”  According to the
brief, the Third Circuit’s “ ‘hard look’” was virtually a de novo appellate review standard.
Id. at *3.
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3. The Court of Appeals Should Have Adopted Daubert Because of
Its Broader Applicability and the Trial Judge’s “Gatekeeper”
Role Requires Actual Consideration of Science
The Court of Appeals should have adopted Daubert because
Daubert’s broader applicability resolves many problems inherent in the
Frye/Reed standard.305  In Frye jurisdictions, a court must resolve
whether the proffered expert testimony incorporates scientific evi-
dence,306 whether that evidence is novel prior to conducting a “gen-
eral acceptance” analysis,307 and how “general acceptance” can be
demonstrated.308  In addition, the jurisdiction must also have a sepa-
rate articulated standard for all other expert testimony.309 Daubert
removes all of these issues.  First, Daubert does not simply apply to
novel scientific theories: “Although the Frye decision itself focused ex-
clusively on ‘novel’ scientific techniques, [the Supreme Court did] not
read the requirements of [FRE] 702 to apply specially or exclusively to
unconventional evidence.”310  Further, in Kumho, the United States
Supreme Court stated that “as a matter of language, [FRE 702] applies
its reliability standard to all ‘scientific,’ ‘technical,’ or ‘other special-
ized’ matters within its scope.”311  According to the Court, there was
no reason not to extend Daubert’s “basic gatekeeping obligation” to all
expert testimony.312
Application of the Frye/Reed standard also does not require “[t]he
court itself . . . to comprehend the science involved”; indeed, “[it]
only had to assure itself that among the people involved in the field,
the technique was accepted as reliable.”313  Further, this “general ac-
305. See Bernstein, supra note 237, at 404–07 (arguing that Daubert and FRE 702 apply to R
an expert’s reasoning and non-scientific opinion testimony, and require trial judges to
“grappl[e] with the quality of the scientific evidence before them”); Andrew R. Stolfi, Note,
Why Illinois Should Abandon Frye’s General Acceptance Standard for the Admission of Novel Scien-
tific Evidence, 78 CHI-KENT L. REV. 861, 887 (2003) (articulating three problems raised by
Frye’s application to only novel scientific evidence: “(1) defining ‘novel,’ (2) defining ‘sci-
entific evidence,’ and (3) determining what standard to apply to the admission of other
types of expert evidence”).
306. 22 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PRO-
CEDURE 87 n.10 (1978) (“What is ‘scientific evidence’ to which the test applies?  When a
witness testifies that he saw the defendant throw a rock at the victim, the inferences to be
drawn from this testimony involve a number of principles of physics, but few courts would
apply the Frye test.”).
307. Stolfi, supra note 305, at 887. R
308. Bernstein, supra note 237, at 407. R
309. Id. at 405; Stolfi, supra note 305, at 887. R
310. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592 n.11 (1993).
311. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 147 (1999).
312. Id.
313. WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 242, § 702.05[1]. R
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ceptance” standard remains “remarkably vague.”314  The court must
determine what field of science is at issue prior to determining the
identity of the relevant scientific community and what exactly consti-
tutes “general acceptance.”315  In contrast, the Daubert standard does
not allow courts “to avoid grappling with the quality of the scientific
evidence before them.”316  According to Judge Grimm, “[u]nder
Daubert . . . the trial court [is] forced to reckon with the factors that
really do determine whether the evidence is reliable, relevant and
‘fits’ the case at issue.”317  The Court of Appeals ought to adopt
Daubert to require consideration of the science upon which expert tes-
timony is based.
Finally, the reasoning behind the Frye/Reed standard actually fa-
vors the Daubert approach as Daubert has proven to be the stricter stan-
dard.318  According to Reed, “Frye was deliberately intended to
interpose a substantial obstacle to the unrestrained admission of evi-
dence based upon new scientific principles.”319  The court in Blackwell
reaffirmed this approach to admissibility: Fairness to the litigant per-
mits “the ‘Frye standard [to] retard[ ] somewhat the admission of
proof based on new methods of scientific investigation.’”320  There-
fore, to remain consistent with the reasoning behind the Frye/Reed
standard, the court should have adopted the stricter Daubert standard.
V. CONCLUSION
In Blackwell v. Wyeth, the Maryland Court of Appeals addressed
the admissibility of expert testimony attempting to prove a causal con-
nection between thimerosal-containing vaccines and autism.321  The
court held the testimony of the Blackwells’ proffered epidemiological
expert inadmissible pursuant to the Frye/Reed standard because his
methodology, theory, and analytical framework were not generally ac-
cepted within the relevant scientific community.322  The court also
314. WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 306, at 87. R
315. MCCORMICK’S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 490 (Edward W. Clearly ed., 2d
ed. 1972) (“The difficulty [is] of determining how to distinguish scientific evidence from
other expert testimony, of deciding what is the particular field of science to which the
evidence belongs, and of settling what is general acceptance . . . .”).
316. Bernstein, supra note 237, at 406. R
317. United States v. Horn, 185 F. Supp. 2d 530, 553 (D. Md. 2002).
318. Bernstein, supra note 237, at 404. R
319. Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374, 386, 391 A.2d 364, 370 (1978) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting People v. Kelly, 549 P.2d 1240, 1245 (Cal. 1976)).
320. Blackwell v. Wyeth, 408 Md. 575, 586, 971 A.2d 235, 242 (2009) (citations and
internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Reed, 283 Md. at 385, 391 A.2d at 369–70).
321. Id. at 577, 971 A.2d at 236–37.
322. Id. at 585, 608–09, 617–18, 971 A.2d at 241, 255, 260–61.
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found the plaintiff’s remaining experts lacked the necessary qualifica-
tions to testify as to disease causation pursuant to Maryland Rule of
Evidence 5-702.323  In so holding, the court accurately excluded the
expert testimony,324 but collapsed the Maryland Frye/Reed admissibility
standard into the federal Daubert standard by relying on Daubert prece-
dent and considering several Daubert factors.325  This unacknowledged
collapse does not account for differences in the potential arguments
to be raised by litigants, the roles of trial judges in determining admis-
sibility of expert testimony discussing novel scientific theories, and fi-
nally, the appellate review standards associated with the Frye/Reed and
Daubert standards.  Instead, the court should have formally adopted
Daubert to avoid inconsistencies in expert testimony admissibility stan-
dards326 and to promote a true “gatekeeper” role for trial judges.327
323. Id. at 618, 630, 971 A.2d at 261, 268.
324. See supra Part IV.A.
325. See supra Part IV.B.
326. See supra Part IV.C.1–2.
327. See supra Part IV.C.3.
